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Abstract
The Artificial Prediction Market is a recent machine learning tech-
nique for multi-class classification, inspired from the financial markets. It
involves a number of trained market participants that bet on the possible
outcomes and are rewarded if they predict correctly. This paper gener-
alizes the scope of the Artificial Prediction Markets to regression, where
there are uncountably many possible outcomes and the error is usually
the MSE. For that, we introduce the reward kernel that rewards each par-
ticipant based on its prediction error and we derive the price equations.
Using two reward kernels we obtain two different learning rules, one of
which is approximated using Hermite-Gauss quadrature. The market set-
ting makes it easy to aggregate specialized regressors that only predict
when an observation falls into their specialization domain. Experiments
show that regression markets based on the two learning rules outperform
Random Forest Regression on many UCI datasets and are rarely outper-
formed.
1 Introduction
Prediction markets are forums of trade where contracts on the outcomes of fu-
ture events are bought and sold. Each contract is a wager that yields payment
if its corresponding outcome occurs. Each market participant has an incentive
to profit and therefore an incentive to predict accurately. The trading prices of
contracts are determined by supply and demand. Highly demanded contracts
are more expensive and represent an overall confidence that a corresponding
outcome will be realized. On the other hand, less demanded contracts are less
expensive and represent an overall lack of confidence that a corresponding out-
come will be realized. These trading prices can be interpreted as the market’s
prediction of the outcome. Studies have shown that the trading prices even es-
timate the true probability of the outcome Manski (2006). Prediction markets
have found use in predicting elections, decision making in both government and
business realms, and even sporting events Arrow et al. (2008). Their reported
accuracy and success motivated the development of the Artificial Prediction
Market Lay (2009); Lay & Barbu (2010); Barbu & Lay (2011) that attempts to
mimic a real prediction market in a machine learning setting. The Artificial Pre-
diction Market has empirically proven to be a competitive classifier aggregation
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technique and motivates further investigation. It was proved in Barbu & Lay
(2011) that the Artificial Prediction Market learns by constrained Maximum
Likelihood.
In this paper we generalize the Artificial Prediction Market to regression.
While the objective of classification is to predict a label from a finite set of labels,
the objective of regression is to predict a real value response. We develop a
mathematical analog of the Artificial Prediction Market, the Regression Market,
to deal with real values, or uncountably many “labels”. Regression markets
are unusual in that contracts are no longer discrete and finite. Each contract
corresponds to a real value prediction and consequently there are uncountably
many such contracts for trade. While in classification a contract that has not
predicted the correct outcome does not win anything, for regression we introduce
the reward kernel that rewards contracts based on the distance to the ground
truth value.
We further show experiments on UCI Frank & Asuncion (2010) and LI-
AAD Torgo (2010) data sets that demonstrate that the Regression Market is a
viable technique for aggregating regressors, and also works very well with spe-
cialized regressors that only predict outcomes for certain instances and not for
other.
2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no other work on solving regression
tasks with machine learning models of prediction markets. Related work can be
found for classification in Lay & Barbu (2010); Barbu & Lay (2011) where Ar-
tificial Prediction Markets were developed for classification using betting func-
tions and an equilibrium based on conservation of budget sum.
Another model can be found in Storkey (2011) where machine learning mar-
kets are instead derived from utility functions.
In Chen & Vaughan (2010) the authors find a connection between no-regret
learning and prediction markets.
3 Overview of the Artificial Prediction Markets
In Lay & Barbu (2010), the classification market is defined by a betting function
φk(x, c) that describes the proportion of the budget β to allot for label k for a
given instance x and trading prices for all labels c. The equilibrium price c is
defined such that the for any label, the sum of profits equaled the sum of losses
M∑
m=1
βm
φym(x, c)
cy
=
M∑
m=1
βm
K∑
k=1
φkm(x, c) y = 1, 2, . . . ,K
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This equilibrium system corresponds to the update rule for the classification
market
βm ← βm − βm
K∑
k=1
φkm(x, c) + βm
φym(x, c)
cy
for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . This is the profit. With a little reworking, the above
equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following fixed point problem
ck =
M∑
m=1
βmφ
k
m(x, c) k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
The trading price c is considered to be an estimate of the conditional mass.
In fact, Barbu & Lay (2011) demonstrates that the classification market max-
imizes log likelihood.
4 Regression Markets
The extension of prediction markets to the regression problem proves to be
counterintuitive. In classification, the goal is to predict the one correct label
for a given instance. What can be said about regression? Assume, for the
time being that the classification market framework generalizes. For the sake of
consistency with probability notation φ(y|x, c) will denote a betting functional
that allots a proportion of the budget for response y ∈ R. This implies that
0 ≤
∫
Y
φ(y|x, c)dy ≤ 1 (1)
since no participant may bet more than the whole of their budget in this market.
A curious consequence of this constraint is that it is possible for φ(y|x, c) > 1
for some y. Likewise, the trading prices for y are denoted as the price function
c(y|x). The trading price is a conditional density on the possible responses y.
The prediction can be computed from, for example, expectation
y =
∫
Y
tc(t|x)dt (2)
However, the price function can also model ambiguous responses. For example,
points along a circle could result in a bimodal price function.
The equilibrium price function c(y|x) receives similar treatment as the classifica-
tion market. The objective is to find a c(y|x) that gives conservation of budget.
The ambiguity of the correct label mentioned above is resolved by introducing
a reward kernel K(t; y). The reward kernel is a density with a single mode
centered about the ground truth y. The winnings are subsequently defined as
winnings =
∫
Y
K(t; y)
φ(t|x, c)
c(t|x) dt (3)
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and bears similarity to the winnings in the classification market. This has the
effect of partially rewarding participants for nearby predictions. Likewise, the
total expenditures for contracts are given as
bet =
∫
Y
φ(t|x, c)dt (4)
Analogous to the classification market, the equilibrium price function c(y|x) is
defined such that gains match losses
M∑
m=1
βm
∫
Y
K(t; y)
φm(t|x, c)
c(t|x) dt =
M∑
m=1
βm
∫
Y
φm(t|x, c)dt (5)
4.1 Constant Market for Regression
For simplicity and the reported empirical performance of the constant classi-
fication market, the remainder of this paper assumes φ(y|x, c) = h(y|x) where
h(y|x) is a conditional density with mean f(x). Here f(x) is a regressor. This
defines the constant market for regression with
c(y|x) =
M∑
m=1
βmhm(y|x) (6)
y =
∫
Y
tc(t|x)dt =
M∑
m=1
βmfm(x) (7)
The update rule is similar to that of the classification market in exception to
the additional reward kernel
βm ← βm + ηβm
(∫
Y
K(t; y)
hm(t|x)
c(t|x) dt− 1
)
(8)
where η is the learning rate and also serves to prevent instanaeous bankruptcy
(i.e. β = 0). The choice of K(t; y) gives different update rules. We exam-
ine K(t; y) = δ(t − y) where δ(t) is the Dirac delta function and K(t; y) =
1√
2piσ
e
−(t−y)2
2σ2
4.2 Delta Updates
When K(t; y) = δ(t−y) this gives an analogous update rule as the classification
market
βm ← βm + ηβm
(
hm(y|x)
c(y|x) − 1
)
(9)
Even though this reward kernel is exacting, it will be shown empirically to work
relatively well.
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4.3 Gaussian Updates
When K(t; y) = 1√
2piσ
e
−(t−y)2
2σ2 , this gives an update involving an integral
βm ← βm + ηβm
(∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
−(t−y)2
2σ2
hm(t|x)
c(t|x) dt− 1
)
(10)
One way to approximate this integral is with Hermite-Gauss quadrature Press
(2007). A change of variables is required to apply the quadrature rule
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
−(t−y)2
2σ2
hm(t|x)
c(t|x) dt (11)
=
1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2 hm(y +
√
2σt|x)
c(y +
√
2σt|x) dt (12)
≈ 1√
pi
n∑
i=1
ωi
hm(y +
√
2σti|x)
c(y +
√
2σti|x)
(13)
where ωi, ti are the n-point Hermite-Gauss weights and nodal points.
Intuitively, the choice of σ should reflect the noise variance of the training data
(assuming Gaussian noise). If σ is too small, the market is more prone to
overfitting. This σ can be chosen with cross validation by discretizing α ∈ (0, 1]
and trying σ = α
√
1
N
∑N
n=1 y
2
n (assuming the noise has mean 0).
4.4 Specialized Regression Markets
Introduced in Lay & Barbu (2010), specialized markets are markets with par-
ticipants which have local support in the feature space. This type of participant
is assumed to perform relatively well in its domain. An example of a specialized
market is a market with random tree leaves as participants. These types of
markets have been demonstrated to be competitive with random forest. The
specialized regression market of tree leaves is similar except that leaves are
Gaussian instead of histograms. Each regression tree stores the sample mean y¯
and variance σ2 of instances that fall in each leaf.
5 Results
We performed two types of experiments with both updates (9), (10) and com-
pared with Breiman’s original regression results Breiman (2001) as well as ad-
ditional data sets from UCI and LIAAD Torgo (2010). To be consistent with
Breiman, nearly all experiments were conducted over 100 random splits where
each split randomly sets aside 10% of the data set for testing. For abalone, only
10 random splits with 25% of the data set aside for testing were considered.
Data sets with provided test sets were not randomly split. Instead, the forest
and markets were trained 100 times on the entire training set and tested on the
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Table 1: Table of MSE for forests and markets on UCI and LIAAD data sets.
The F column is the number of inputs, Y is the range of regression, RFB is
Breiman’s reported error, RF is our forest implementation, DM is the Mar-
ket with delta updates, and GM is the Market with Gaussian updates. Bul-
lets/daggers represent pairwise significantly better/worse than RF while +/–
represent significantly better/worse than RFB.
Data Ntrain Ntest F Y RFB RF DM GM
abalone 4177 – 8 [1.00, 29.00] 4.600 4.571 4.571 4.571
friedman1 200 2000 10 [4.30, 26.03] 5.700 4.343+ 4.335•+ 4.193•+
friedman2 200 2000 4 [−167.99, 1633.87] 19600.0 19431.852 19232.482• 18369.546•+
friedman3 200 2000 4 [0.13, 1.73] 0.022 0.028– 0.028•– 0.026•–
housing 506 – 13 [5.00, 50.00] 10.200 10.471 10.130• 10.128•
ozone 330 – 8 [1.00, 38.00] 16.300 16.916 16.925 16.917
servo 167 – 4 [0.13, 7.10] 0.246 0.336 0.295 0.322
ailerons 7154 6596 40 [−0.00,−0.00] – 2.814e-008 2.814e-008• 2.814e-008•
auto-mpg 392 – 7 [9.00, 46.60] – 6.469 6.444 6.405•
auto-price 159 – 15 [5118.00, 35056.00] – 3823550.43 3723413.430 3815863.98
bank 4500 3693 32 [0.00, 0.67] – 7.238e-003 7.212e-003• 7.210e-003•
breast cancer 194 – 32 [1.00, 125.00] – 1112.270 1112.509 1108.325
cartexample 40768 – 10 [−12.69, 12.20] – 1.233 1.233† 1.232•
computeractivity 8192 – 21 [0.00, 99.00] – 5.414 5.398• 5.414†
diabetes 43 – 2 [3.00, 6.60] – 0.415 0.426† 0.415
elevators 8752 7847 18 [0.01, 0.08] – 9.319e-006 9.288e-006• 9.225e-006•
forestfires 517 – 12 [0.00, 1090.84] – 5834.819 5844.493† 5680.131•
kinematics 8192 – 8 [0.04, 1.46] – 0.013 0.013• 0.013•
machine 209 – 6 [6.00, 1150.00] – 3154.521 2991.798• 3042.336
poletelecomm 5000 10000 48 [0.00, 100.00] – 29.813 28.855• 29.863†
pumadyn 4499 3693 32 [−0.09, 0.09] – 9.237e-005 8.917e-005• 8.888e-005•
pyrimidines 74 – 27 [0.10, 0.90] – 0.013 0.013 0.012
triazines 186 – 60 [0.10, 0.90] – 0.015 0.015 0.015
provided test set. These results vary due to the randomness of the regression
forest.
All experiments were run on Windows 7 with 8GB of RAM and Core i7-2630QM
process (max 2.9GHz, 6MB L3 cache). On each training set 100 regression trees
were trained. Each regression tree node considered 25 randomized features,
each a linear combination of 2 random inputs. Each coefficient of the linear
combination was uniformly picked from [−1, 1]. In our implementation, 1000
of these random features were generated in advance rather than at each node.
The split criteria for each node is based on the weighted sample variance. The
rule “don’t split if the sample size is < 5” was enforced. Additionally, our im-
plementation treats categoricals as numeric inputs which differs from Breiman’s
implementation. However, most data sets are comprised of numeric inputs.
Both market types were trained and evaluated over 50 epochs. Each epoch is
one complete pass through the training set. The reported errors are those that
minimize the MSE of the test set over the 50 epochs (averaged over the 100
runs).
MSE =
1
N
N∑
n=1
(f(xn)− yn)2 (14)
The learning rate η = 10
Ntrain
was used as in Barbu & Lay (2011). On the first
run (random split or full training set), the parameter σ for the Gaussian Market
reward kernel was estimated using 2-fold cross validation on the training set.
This σ remained constant for the other 99 runs (9 runs for abalone). The
Gaussian market used 5-point Hermite Gauss quadrature. The prediction for y
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was computed with expectation
y =
∫
Y
tc(t|x)dt =
M∑
m=1
βmfm(x) (15)
In every result, significance is measured with significance level α = 0.01 in two
ways: pairwise t-test Demsˇar (2006) and t-test on the means. The pairwise
t-test was used to compare the 100 market runs with the 100 forest runs while
the t-test on the means were compared with Breiman’s reported results.
5.1 Comparison with Random Forest Regression
The first experiment considers aggregation of tree leaves of forests with fully
grown trees on UCI and LIAAD data sets. The results of seven of the data
sets are compared with Breiman’s reported results. The missing data set Robot
Arm is private.
From 5 our RF doesn’t perform identically with RFB. This can be attributed
to the synthetic nature of some data sets such as friedman1, friedman2, and
friedman3 and/or the fact that our implementation of regression forest does not
treat categorical inputs the same way. Of the Breiman comparisons, only GM
is legitimately significantly better than Breiman’s results for friedman2. Out
of all the data sets, DM is significantly better than RF for 12 data sets (in
a pairwise sense) while GM is only significantly better than RF for 11 data
sets. However, DM is significantly worse than RF for 3 data sets while GM is
only significantly worse on 2 data sets. The significantly worse results can be
attributed to overfitting and/or poorly tuned reward kernel in the case of GM.
Table 2: Table of MSE for depth 5 forests and markets on UCI and LIAAD
data sets. The F column is the number of inputs, Y is the range of regression,
RFB is Breiman’s reported error (these errors are from fully grown trees), RF
is our forest implementation, DM is the Market with delta updates, and GM
is the Market with Gaussian updates, and Speedup is the speedup factor of a
depth 5 tree versus a depth 10 tree for evaluation. Bullets/daggers represent
pairwise significantly better/worse than RF while +/– represent significantly
better/worse than RFB.
Data Ntrain Ntest F Y RFB RF DM GM Speedup
abalone 4177 – 8 [1.00, 29.00] 4.600 4.438 4.318•+ 4.438 3.3
friedman1 200 2000 10 [4.30, 26.03] 5.700 5.076+ 4.701•+ 4.429•+ 1.8
friedman2 200 2000 4 [−167.99, 1633.87] 19600.0 29343.562– 23200.438•– 21183.421•– 1.9
friedman3 200 2000 4 [0.13, 1.73] 0.022 0.034– 0.029•– 0.028•– 2.0
housing 506 – 13 [5.00, 50.00] 10.200 12.869– 12.056•– 11.947•– 2.2
ozone 330 – 8 [1.00, 38.00] 16.300 16.976 16.964 16.932 2.1
servo 167 – 4 [0.13, 7.10] 0.246 0.248 0.241 0.254 1.6
auto-mpg 392 – 7 [9.00, 46.60] – 8.248 7.817• 7.750• 2.1
auto-price 159 – 15 [5118.00, 35056.00] – 4699789.7 4524741.81 4431992.3 1.4
breast cancer 194 – 32 [1.00, 125.00] – 1073.319 1071.820 1072.126 2.1
diabetes 43 – 2 [3.00, 6.60] – 0.400 0.426† 0.393 0.7
forestfires 517 – 12 [0.00, 1090.84] – 4945.630 5445.001† 5196.451† 2.2
machine 209 – 6 [6.00, 1150.00] – 3137.001 3127.932 2930.506 1.8
triazines 186 – 60 [0.10, 0.90] – 0.016 0.015• 0.015• 2.0
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5.2 Fast Regression using Shallow Trees
This experiment examined the aggregation capabilities of the regression market
with shallow trees. In many problems, it is prohibitively expensive to train and
even evaluate deep trees. In practice this is mitigated by enforcing a maximum
tree depth. For example in Criminisi et al. (2011) and R Girshick & Criminisi
(2011) the regression trees were constrained to depth 7. However, this strict
constraint on tree depth is prone to introduce leaves that do not generalize well
due to prematurely halting tree growth. The specialized regression market of
tree leaves can be used to weight the leaves. Poorly performing leaves will tend
to have less weight thus improving the overall prediction accuracy.
In addition to the previously mentioned experiment details, regression trees were
grown with a maximum depth of 10. Using the same depth 10 trees, MSE errors
were computed for leaves no deeper than depth 5. Both depth 5 and depth 10
evaluations for training and test sets were recorded. The timings for the larger of
the two sets were averaged over the 100 runs and used to compute the speedup.
The markets were applied to the depth 5 leaves only. Since the market is just a
linear aggregation of 100 leaves per instance, the reported speedup for forest is
similar to the speedup of the market.
From 5.1 it can be seen that the depth 5 forest is roughly twice the speed of the
depth 10 forest. On diabetes, the small data set, features and forest likely fit
in cache giving the strange 0.7 speedup. DM performs significantly better than
RF on seven data sets (in a pairwise set) while DM only performs significantly
better on six data sets. However, DM performs significantly worse on two data
sets while GM performs significantly worse on one. No method legitimately
performs significantly better than RFB since RF is already better than RFB
on those two data sets. The significantly worse results can be attributed to
overfitting and/or poorly tuned reward kernel in the case of GM.
6 Conclusion
This work presented a generalization of the Artificial Prediction Markets from
classification to regression with uncountably many outcomes. It introduced two
types of update rules and demonstrated their learning ability through experi-
ments on UCI and LIAAD datasets. Furthermore, it showed the capability of
the regression market to aggregate shallow tree leaves into much better regres-
sors than those obtained by voting. In future work we plan to use the market
for regression with non-uniform noise levels and multi-modal conditional prob-
abilities p(y|x).
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